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DETENTION AND INTERROGATION IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 
 
Kermit Roosevelt III∗ 
 
I. Executive Action: The Road to Guantanamo 
 
On September 11, terrorists pilot hijacked airliners into the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon.  Over 3000 Americans are killed.  The nation—indeed the world—is 
stunned.  The French paper Le Monde runs a headline: We are all Americans.1  There are 
candlelight vigils outside the US embassy in Tehran.2 
 The American government responds immediately.  On September 18, Congress 
passes a joint resolution authorizing the president  
 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.  
 
 The lawyers of the Executive branch are also at work.  A September 25 
memorandum from Deputy Assistant General John Yoo of the Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) asserts that the President can “deploy military force preemptively against 
terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they can 
be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11.”3  The Framing generation, 
the memo explains, “well understood that declarations of war were obsolete.”4  No 
statute, it concludes, “can place any limits on the President’s determinations as to any 
terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, 
and nature of the response.”5   
 Pursuant to either the limited grant of power in the congressional authorization for 
the use of military force or the boundless one suggested by the OLC, the Executive 
begins military action.  On October 7, American and British forces launch a bombing 
campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.  Land offensives follow.  On 
November 13, President Bush issues an Executive order authorizing the Secretary of 
Defense to detain any individual who is not a U.S. citizen and whom the President 
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determines to be a terrorist.  Prisoners come into the hands of U.S. forces by various 
means.  Some are battlefield captures; some are turned over by the Northern Alliance or 
Pakistani authorities.  To swell this number, the U.S. offers cash bounties for members of 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  In November 2001, Donald Rumsfeld tells us that the leaflets 
are “dropping like snowflakes in December in Chicago.”6 They promise “wealth and 
power beyond your dreams … enough money to take care of your family, your village, 
your tribe for the rest of your life.”7  Other prisoners are apprehended in places far 
removed from Afghanistan, including Gambia and Bosnia.8 
 Where to hold these people is a question Executive lawyers have been mulling 
over.  On December 28, 2001, John Yoo and Patrick Philbin complete a memo 
addressing “the question whether a federal district court would properly have jurisdiction 
to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of an alien detained at 
the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”9  The answer, the memo concludes, is 
no.  For this reason, the memo suggests, Guantanamo is superior to other locations 
considered as possible detention sites, such as Wake or Midway Islands.10 
 The public statements of Executive officials at this time suggest that the 
Guantanamo detainees are a select group, “among the most dangerous, best trained, 
vicious killers on the face of the earth.”11  They are “the worst of a very bad lot,” “very 
dangerous people who would gnaw through the hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to 
bring it down.”12  Within the government, the information is more equivocal.  In January 
2002, then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales asks the military to provide him with 
a one-page form for each prisoner so that prosecutors can start selecting those who will 
be charged with war crimes.  Intelligence officers respond that they don’t have enough 
evidence on most prisoners to complete the forms.  Their intelligence gathering efforts 
are handicapped by the fact that they can’t understand Afghan culture; they can’t sort 
valuable tips from attempts to use Americans as retaliation in inter-clan feuds; they can’t 
even tell if their interpreters are loyal.13  Classified intelligence reports describe detainees 
as farmers, cab drivers, cobblers, and laborers.14  In February 2002, Major General 
Michael Dunlavey concludes that as many as half have “little or no intelligence value.”15   
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The Executive has also been making plans about what to do with the detainees. 
As Guantanamo is intended to be outside the jurisdiction of courts, the detainees are 
intended to be outside the bounds of law.  The Executive Order of November 13 
authorizes the creation of military tribunals to try terror suspects.  And it provides that no 
individual subject to the order shall be “be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any 
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on 
the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any 
court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.”16   
 A January 2002 memo from Yoo argues that neither al Qaeda nor Taliban 
members are protected by the Geneva Conventions or the War Crimes Act.17  A February 
7 memo from the President endorses this reasoning: al Qaeda detainees are unprotected 
because al Qaeda is not party to the Geneva Convention.  As for the Taliban, all Taliban 
detainees are summarily determined to be unlawful combatants and therefore disqualified 
from claiming prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention.18   
 On February 26, 2002, Jay Bybee submits a memo to William Haynes, the 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense.  The subject of the memo is “potential 
legal constraints applicable to interrogations of persons captured by U.S. armed forces in 
Afghanistan.”  The memo is focused on the effect that failure to provide Miranda 
warnings and legal representation might have on subsequent criminal prosecution in 
federal court, and it concludes that the effects will be minor.   
 On August 1, Bybee, with the assistance of Yoo, submits a memo asking some 
different questions.  What interrogation techniques might violate the federal law 
prohibiting torture?  Not many, they conclude.  To qualify as torture, a technique must 
inflict pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury such 
as organ failure.”  Mental pain or suffering “must result in significant psychological harm 
of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”19  The technique must be 
used with the specific intent to inflict such pain—possibly, the memo suggests, an 
interrogation technique is not torture if it is being used to extract information rather than 
to inflict pain. 
  Even conduct meeting these requirements may be excused in some circumstances 
on the grounds of necessity or self defense.  Last, the Commander-in-Chief override 
offers a safe harbor.  “Any effort to apply” the torture ban “in a manner that interferes 
with the President’s direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation 
of enemy combatants … would be unconstitutional.”20    As Yoo later tells a New Yorker 
reporter, interrogation is “the core of the commander-in-chief function.”  Congress “can’t 
prevent the president from ordering torture.”21   
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16 See The White House, President Issues Military Order, November 13, 2001, available at 
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19 See memo from Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzales, reprinted in Greenberg & Dratel, supra note [], at 172. 
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http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6.  
 This legal analysis of the range of possible techniques does not answer the policy 
question of which should be used.  The Army Field Manual on Interrogations cautions 
“Experience indicates that the use of prohibited techniques is not necessary to gain the 
cooperation of interrogation sources. Use of torture and other illegal methods is a poor 
technique that yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and 
can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.”22  In 
October 2002, however, General James Hill reports that “some detainees have 
tenaciously resisted our interrogation methods.”23  Hill asks for review of proposed 
“counter-resistant techniques.” 
 The proposed techniques are divided into three categories.  Category I includes 
basic questioning, yelling, the use of multiple interrogators, and deception including 
“false flag,” the representation that an interrogator is from “a country with a reputation 
for harsh treatment of detainees.”24  Category II techniques require approval from the 
officer in charge. They include the use of stress positions, falsified documents, isolation, 
sensory deprivation, hooding, forced shaving and nudity, and the use of 20-hour 
interrogations.  Standing is given as an example of a stress position.25 
 Category III techniques require approval from the commanding general at 
Guantanamo and legal review by the commander of the US Southern command.  They 
include mock executions, threatened killings of family members, exposure to cold 
weather or water, waterboarding, and mild physical contact.  An accompanying memo 
from military attorney Diane Beaver asserts that none of the proposed techniques violates 
the Constitution or the federal torture statute as long as the intent is to secure information.  
Beaver’s analysis relies heavily on the argument that an interrogator using these 
techniques would lack the specific intent to inflict suffering.26  The Army Field Manual, 
by contrast, lists stress positions as an example of physical torture and mock executions 
as an example of mental torture.27 Indeed, the federal torture statute lists mock executions 
as an example of torture through the infliction of severe mental pain or suffering.28  
Given that specificity, Beaver warns that “[c]aution should be used with this technique.” 
 On November 27, Department of Defense general counsel William Haynes 
recommends that Rumsfeld approve all of Categories I and II and the mild contact from 
Category III.  Rumsfeld does so, and adds a hand-written note: “I stand for 8-10 hours a 
day.  Why is standing limited to 4?”29   
 Between November 2002 and January 2003, Mohammed Al Qahtani is 
interrogated 18 to 20 hours a day.  He is woken with showers of water when he falls 
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28 See 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(c). 
29 Action Memo from William Haynes to Donald Rumsfeld, November 27, 2002, reprinted in Greenberg, 
supra note [], at 237.   
asleep.  He is made to stand at attention or sit immobile for hours at a time and to stand 
naked in the presence of jeering female interrogators.  He is led around on a leash, and 
forced to bark like a dog, and to come and stay in response to commands.  He is 
threatened by military dogs, shaved, dressed in women’s underwear, forced to urinate in 
his pants, told that he is being sent to Egypt, flown around in a plane for several hours, 
and then questioned by interrogators who pose as Egyptians.  During this time he 
confesses to being the 20th September 11 hijacker.  He implicates 30 other detainees as 
associates of Bin Laden, identifying their photos.30  He also reports hearing voices and 
spends hours talking to himself or to invisible people, cowering under a sheet in the 
corner of his cell.31 When Time Magazine reveals the details of his interrogation in a 
story that runs on June 12, 2005, the Pentagon responds that his handling is consistent 
with its “unequivocal standard of humane treatment for all detainees.”32   
 Neither the Hill memo nor the Beaver analysis mentions the existence of Category 
IV. But an FBI agent on the base sends a memo to his superiors describing it: “Detainee 
will be sent off GTMO, either temporarily or permanently, to Jordan, Egypt, or another 
third country to allow those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will allow 
them to get the required information.”33 As former CIA agent Robert Baer puts it, “If you 
want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be 
tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear -- never to see them 
again -- you send them to Egypt.”34    
On September 26, 2002, Maher Arar, a Canadian born in Syria, is arrested at 
J.F.K. airport on his way back to Canada from Tunisia.  He is questioned for thirteen days 
by Americans, then flown to Jordan and driven to Syria, where he is beaten with 
electrical cables.  His interrogators ask him the same questions as the Americans, and 
under their treatment he confesses to everything they suggest.  In October 2003 he is 
released without charges.  The Syrian ambassador to the United States says his country 
has found nothing linking Arar to terrorism.35   
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32 M126.  DOD news release June 12, 2005.  An internal investigation reaches the conclusion that the 
treatment of Qahtani was “abusive and degrading” but still humane.  See Final Report, Investigation into 
FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Detention Facility, available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/Schmidt%20Furlow%20report.pdf.  The judge advocates general, by contrast, 
testify to Congress that the treatment violated the Army Field Manual  guidelines.  See Josh White, Military 
Lawyers Say Tactics Broke Rules, The Washington Post, March 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/15/AR2006031502299.html.  
33 See Michael Isikoff, Secret Memo: Send to be Tortured, Newsweek, August 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8769416/site/newsweek/rf/technorati/.  The FBI memo also concludes that 
several of the interrogation techniques in categories II and III violate the Constitution and the Torture 
Statute.  See memo, available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/rendition.fbi.memo.pdf.  
34 One Huge U.S. Jail, The Guardian/U.K., March 19, 2005, available at 
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35 See Cole & Lobel, supra note [], at 24-25.  Other examples of mistaken extraordinary rendition include 
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of a 9/11 hijacker, and a college professor implicated by an al-Qaeda operative during interrogation, 
apparently because the professor “had given the al-Qaeda member a bad grade.”  Id. at 27.  Both Arar and 
el-Masri have filed civil suits based on their renditions, which the Executive defeated on the grounds that 
allowing the suits to proceed might reveal information damaging to national security.  Id. at 42-43. 
 Support for these approaches is not uniform within the Executive branch. In 
December 2002, Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora learns of the interrogation 
techniques being used.  He believes they are “unlawful and unworthy of the military 
services” and that Beaver’s supporting memo is “wholly inadequate.”36  Mora worries 
that “[b]ecause the American public would not tolerate such abuse, … the political fallout 
was likely to be severe.”37 In January 2003, Mora presents his concerns to the 
Department of Defense, arguing that the interrogation practices are “illegal and contrary 
to American values” and that in any case the difficult policy and ethical issues raised by 
interrogation should not be decided within the Pentagon but rather through “national 
debate.”38 
 On January 15, Rumsfeld rescinds the order approving the use of selected 
Category II and III techniques.  He creates a Working Group consisting of experts from 
the Department of Defense and the Military Departments, and instructs it to review 
interrogation issues and report in fifteen days.  Mora, overseeing the Navy’s 
participation, asks naval intelligence officers to contribute memoranda reflecting the 
expert consensus that torture is an ineffective interrogation technique.39  The Working 
Group also receives a memo from OLC that largely replicates the analysis of the Beaver 
memo and includes an expansive statement of the Commander-in-Chief override.  Based 
on the OLC memo, the Working Group leadership rejects Mora’s attempts to insert an 
analysis of 8th Amendment limitations on interrogation techniques.40  In February, Mora 
tells Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes that the Working Group 
draft report is a deeply flawed document that should never see the light of day.41  Neither 
he nor anyone else in Department of the Navy ever sees a completed version and Mora 
assumes that it has never been finalized.42 
Unbeknownst to Mora, the Working Group submits a final report to Haynes on 
April 4, 2003.43  The report observes that Guantanamo is within the United States for the 
purposes of the Torture Statute, and therefore outside the statute’s coverage.44  But it is 
outside the “sovereign territory” of the United States, and therefore the Constitution gives 
no rights to aliens detained there.45  In its analysis of the statute, the report agrees with 
Yoo and Bybee that interrogation techniques cannot constitute torture as long as the 
intent is to obtain information and suggests that self-defense and necessity may be 
available defenses.  It also agrees that “any effort by Congress to regulate the 
interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the 
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Commander-in-Chief authority in the President.”46  The report endorses, with proper 
safeguards, the use of 35 techniques, including isolation, sleep deprivation, prolonged 
interrogations, environmental manipulation such as prolonged exposure to heat or cold, 
nudity, the use of dogs, threats to transfer prisoners to countries that engage in torture, 
and the impersonation of interrogators from such countries.   
 On April 16, 2003, Donald Rumsfeld approves the use of 24 of these techniques 
at Guantanamo, including sleep adjustment, environmental manipulation, false flag, and 
isolation.  Other techniques are not forbidden, but they require his prior approval. 
In late 2003 and early 2004, FBI agents repeatedly complain about the 
interrogation techniques being used at Guantanamo.  FBI interrogators report finding 
detainees chained to the floor for 18 or 24 hours at a time, lying in their own feces and 
urine.  They are left in extreme heat or extreme cold; one detainee is found lying on the 
floor next to a pile of his own hair, which he has pulled out during the night.47    
Detainees are wrapped in Israeli flags, touched by female interrogators, and smeared with 
fake menstrual blood.  The FBI memos complain that these techniques are ineffective in 
producing reliable information.48 
 The international reaction to the Guantanamo program of detention and 
interrogation is generally very negative.  English law lord Johan Steyn deplores the 
“monstrous failure of justice” that denies detainees judicial process.49  Some foreign 
political figures approve.  In Liberia, Charles Taylor expresses strong support for the 
American war on terrorism.  He announces that opposition to his rule is part of global 
terrorism; he designates an opposition journalist an enemy combatant and has him 
arrested and tortured.  When the United States objects, Taylor responds that he is simply 
acting “in the same manner in which the US treats terrorists.”  Zimbabwe President 
Robert Mugabe describes foreign journalists as terrorist sympathizers. “We agree with 
President Bush,” he says.  “Anyone who in any way finances, harbors, or defends 
terrorists is himself a terrorist.”  Eritrea arrests dissident politicians on the grounds that 
they are agents of Osama bin Laden.50 
In June 2004, under new head Jack Goldsmith, the Office of Legal Counsel 
withdraws the Yoo/Bybee torture memo.  Goldmsith will later characterize the earlier 
memo as “deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and incautious,” and marked by 
“an unusual lack of care and sobriety.”51  On December 30, 2004, the administration 
issues a new interpretation of the torture statute.  The new interpretation abandons the 
specific intent argument but retains the commander-in-chief override argument.  It 
declares torture “abhorrent.”  However, its authors state that they have reviewed the 
earlier memos and that none of the earlier conclusions would be different under the new 
analysis.  In early 2005, following the appointment of Alberto Gonzales as Attorney 
General, the Justice Department issues another memo, this time in secret.  The memo 
provides “explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects with a combination of painful 
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physical and psychological tactics, including head-slapping, simulated drowning and 
frigid temperatures.”52  It is issued over the protest of Deputy Attorney General James 
Comey, who tells colleagues that they will all be ashamed when the memo becomes 
public.53 
 
II. Judicial Response: Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul 
 
During this time, the federal courts have not been idle.  But for years all of the 
skirmishing occurs in lower courts, and all of the decisions against the government are 
stayed pending appeal.  Finally, in the summer of 2004, the Supreme Court decides three 
cases. 
 Yasser Hamdi is an American citizen born in Louisiana.  He is captured by the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in late 2001 and transferred to US custody. In January 
2002 he is brought to Guantanamo.  When the government realizes he’s a citizen, they 
send him to a naval brig in Norfolk.54  In June 2002 his father files a habeas petition on 
Hamdi’s behalf and requests that he be allowed to see a lawyer.  The government opposes 
on the grounds that enemy combatants have no right to counsel and access to a lawyer 
will compromise national security.55  It offers a declaration from Michael Mobbs, a 
special advisor to the undersecretary of defense for policy.  The declaration states that 
Hamdi entered Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, joined the Taliban, and was captured 
by the Northern Alliance in late 2001, carrying a Kalashnikov. The information originates 
with an unknown person in the Northern Alliance; it is transmitted to someone in the US 
military, who puts it in a record, which Mobbs reviews.   
 The Executive argues that this declaration by itself is conclusive justification for 
detention: Hamdi cannot challenge it in court; in fact, he cannot even see it. The 4th 
circuit pronounces it undisputed that Hamdi was arrested in a zone of combat operations 
and concludes that those facts suffice to justify detention.56  (It is undisputed in the sense 
that Hamdi has not been given an opportunity to dispute it.)  The Supreme Court grants 
certiorari on January 9, 2004.57 
 Jose Padilla is another American citizen, born in Brooklyn.  On May 8, 2002, he 
is arrested in Chicago’s O’Hare airport on a material witness warrant.  His appointed 
lawyer, Donna Newman, files a motion challenging the warrant and seeking his release.  
Rather than attempt to defend the warrant, the President designates Padilla an enemy 
combatant, and he is taken into military custody.  Newman files a habeas petition asking 
the government to justify his detention.  The government offers another declaration from 
Michael Mobbs, which says that Padilla had conspired with members of Al-Qaeda to 
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detonate a dirty bomb in the US.58  The declaration, the government argues, is 
conclusive; Padilla cannot challenge it, or see it, or see his lawyer. The district court 
decides that Padilla has the right to challenge the factual basis for his detention and 
orders that he be allowed to meet with his lawyers.59  The government asks for 
reconsideration, and in support submits a sworn declaration from Vice Admiral Lowell 
Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, describing the harm inflicted by 
allowing detainees to meet with lawyers.  
 Successful interrogation, Jacoby declares, depends “upon creating an atmosphere 
of dependency and trust between the subject and the interrogators.”60  Allowing Padilla 
access to counsel would “create expectations by Padilla that his ultimate release may be 
obtained through an adversarial civil litigation process.”61  It would, as the district court 
puts it, delay the Executive’s effort to make him “give[] up hope.”62  The district court 
rejects this argument, and the Supreme Court ultimately grants certiorari on February 20, 
2004.63  (Just before the case is argued the Executive allows Padilla to meet with 
lawyers.) 
 Asif Iqbal is a British citizen who, he says, travels to Pakistan in September 2001 
to get married.  His friend Shafiq Rasul, another British citizen, accompanies him, 
intending to stay in Pakistan after the wedding to take computer classes, which are 
cheaper there than in England.  In October 2001, anticipating an American attack, they go 
to Afghanistan to provide humanitarian aid.  When the shooting starts, they realize this is 
a foolish plan and try to flee.  They are detained by an Afghan warlord and end up in his 
prison.  In December he hands them over to Americans.  In January 2002 they are 
brought to Guantanamo. 
 There, they allege, they are interrogated with temperature manipulation, sleep 
deprivation, stress positions, disorientation, and isolation.  They are told that they could 
be killed at any time, and that no one will know what has happened to them.  The 
Executive denies these allegations.   
Civil rights lawyers file habeas petitions on their behalf.  In the D.C. Circuit, the 
Executive prevails on the theory that Guantanamo is outside the sovereign territory of the 
United States.  Aliens detained there, the court agrees, have no constitutional rights a 
habeas petition could vindicate, and therefore no right to file a habeas petition at all.64  
The Supreme Court grants certiorari on November 10, 2003.65    
 All these cases are argued in April 2004—Rasul on the 20th and Hamdi and 
Padilla on the 28th.  (In March, just before the arguments, the government releases Rasul 
and Iqbal.  They fly home to England, where they are not charged with any wrongdoing.  
Their civil suit seeking damages for alleged beatings and other abuse is pending before 
the D.C. Circuit.) 
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 The Executive’s position is simple.  The United States is at war—this is the first 
sentence of Solicitor General Ted Olsen’s argument in Rasul66—and alien enemies held 
outside the United States have no rights.  As Executive lawyers assert in related litigation 
before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it is free to imprison these people indefinitely, 
and do with them what it wills.  Even if it tortures or summarily executes them, courts 
cannot interfere.67 
 With respect to citizens, the matter is a little more complicated.  Citizens do have 
constitutional rights, no matter where they are held.68 But citizens can still be enemies, 
and the Executive has the power to detain and interrogate them.  The only question is 
what sort of review courts can engage in.  Here utmost deference is demanded, and courts 
can ask at most whether some evidence, such as the declaration of a government official, 
supports detention.69 
 The Justices appear concerned that this is a one-sided procedure.  Should 
detainees not be entitled to some opportunity to show that their detention is a mistake, 
they ask in the Hamdi argument. 
 Indeed they should, says Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement.  “[I]t may not 
seem what you think of as traditional due process in an Article III sense, but the 
interrogation process itself provides an opportunity for an individual to explain that this 
has all been a mistake.”70  Clement does not go on to adduce the example of Shafiq 
Rasul, who is shown a photograph of four people sitting together and asked to confirm 
that they include himself and Mohammed Atta, one of the 9-11 masterminds.  The 
photograph is from a video taken in Afghanistan in the year 2000.  Rasul explains to his 
interrogators that he was in England in 2000, that he worked at an electronics store, and 
that this can be verified.  Interrogation continues, and after five or six weeks he confesses 
that he is indeed the person in the photograph.  He is not; British intelligence later 
confirms that, as he said, he was in England at the time.71 
 The Justices appear skeptical that interrogation provides an adequate opportunity 
to demonstrate innocence.  And though they do not have access to the full menu of 
interrogation techniques available at Guantanamo—the memos on those techniques will 
not be declassified until June 2004—they seem concerned about the conditions of 
interrogation.  In the Padilla argument, Justice Ginsburg puts it directly.  “Suppose the 
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Executive says, ‘Mild torture, we think, will help get this information.’ It’s not a soldier 
who does something against the Code of Military Justice, but it’s an Executive command.  
Some systems do that to get information.”72   
Paul Clement’s response is equally direct.  “Well, our Executive doesn’t.”73 
That evening, the first photos from Abu Ghraib appear on CBS.  They show 
prisoners stripped naked and chained to the bars of their cells or stacked in piles, hooded 
or with women’s underwear on their heads, threatened by dogs, and standing on blocks 
with wires attached to their hands.74 
 Decisions in the three cases come down together on June 28, 2004.  The 
Executive loses all three.  The Court agrees that the Executive has the power to detain as 
enemy combatants anyone who “was ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United 
States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States’ there.”75 But it cannot detain citizens without more process 
than it has afforded them.  Yaser Hamdi, the Court announces, is entitled to some kind of 
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, at which he can rebut the Executive’s allegations.  
“A state of war,” Justice O’Connor writes, “is not a blank check for the president when it 
comes to the rights of this nation’s citizens. … Certainly, we agree that indefinite 
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized. ”76  Padilla’s challenge is 
turned aside on jurisdictional grounds, but his rights have been established by the Hamdi 
decision—perhaps more so, since he does not fit the Hamdi definition of enemy 
combatant. 
 As for the aliens detained at Guantanamo, the Court says that they have the right 
to file a habeas petition.77  This is a decision about the scope of the habeas statute.  It 
does not say that detainees have any constitutional rights to vindicate by means of 
habeas, but it seems unlikely that the Court intends to give them a vehicle to obtain relief 
if relief is categorically unavailable.  And indeed, a footnote in Rasul more or less 
explicitly says that they have the same rights as Hamdi: their allegations, the court says, 
“unquestionably describe custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States.”78 
 
III. Executive Reaction: Retreat and CSRTs 
 
The aftermath of these three cases is somewhat different from what most people 
anticipate. Hamdi, the Court said, is entitled to a day in court when the Executive will be 
required to show its hand and justify his detention.  But this doesn’t happen; instead the 
Executive releases him to Saudi Arabia on the condition that he renounce his citizenship 
and promise not to sue.79  Padilla, likewise, never gets a hearing on the grounds for his 
detention.  Instead, he is transferred to the civil justice system.  Talk of a dirty bomb is 
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dropped, and wrangling begins over whether he is fit to stand trial or has been rendered 
incompetent to assist in his own defense by the interrogation tactics.  The creation of a 
relationship of trust and dependency, Padilla’s lawyers allege, was accomplished, or 
attempted, through isolation, sleep deprivation, environmental manipulation, threats of 
execution or transfer to third countries, hooding, sensory deprivation, stress positions, 
and mind-altering drugs.80  The Executive denies the allegations.  It reports that it has lost 
the videotape made of Padilla’s last interrogation.81 
Psychologists testify that Padilla is mentally impaired.82  The court agrees with 
that assessment, though it makes no ruling as to the cause.  It orders the trial to go 
forward.  Padilla’s lawyers argue that information implicating him has been obtained 
through torture, notably during the interrogation of Abu Zubaydeh.  The Administration 
responds that the claim is “meritless,” on the grounds that no evidence exists to suggest 
that Zubaydeh was tortured.  In fact, the CIA made videotapes of Zubaydeh undergoing 
aggressive interrogation but destroyed those tapes in November 2005.83  On August 16, 
2007, Padilla is convicted.  A White House spokesman comments that Padilla “received a 
fair trial and a just verdict.”84  Padilla’s civil suit for abuse suffered during detention is 
pending. 
 In Rasul, the Executive continues to argue on remand that the detainees have no 
constitutional rights.  But it does something else, too.  On July 7, 2004, it announces that 
it has created Combatant Status Review Tribunals, or CSRTs, to review the status of the 
detainees.  These are supposed to meet the hearing requirements of Hamdi.85 
 A CSRT has a tribunal of three commissioned officers who review information 
presented by a reporter.  The detainee, if he wishes, can testify.  He is not allowed a 
lawyer.  He is allowed to present evidence that the tribunal decides is reasonably 
available.  There is a presumption in favor of the evidence supporting detention, and that 
evidence may be considered even if obtained by torture or coercive interrogation.86  The 
evidence need not be shown to the detainee if it is classified.  The tribunal’s decision is 
reviewed by a superior officer. 
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 The question for the tribunal is whether the detainee is an enemy combatant, 
which is defined as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda 
forces.  This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly 
supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces.”87 
 In litigation in the D.C. district court, the Executive says the category of enemy 
combatant includes the following people: 
 
a little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity 
that helps orphans but is really a front for Al Qaeda. … A resident of London who 
collects money from worshipers at mosques to support a hospital in Syria but 
entrusts the money for that purpose to someone who is an Al Qaeda member. … a 
resident of Dublin who teaches English to the son of a person who the CIA knows 
to be a member of Al Qaeda.88   
  
 The evidentiary rules under which the CSRTs operate create their own problems.  
Mustafa Ait Idir is one of six Bosnians arrested in Sarajevo in October 2001 by Bosnian 
authorities on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy.  After a three-month 
investigation turns up no supporting evidence, the Bosnian Supreme Court orders their 
release.  The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina issues an order 
prohibiting their removal from Bosnia.  Nonetheless, U.S. military personnel transport 
them to Guantanamo.89  In his CSRT, Idir is told that he has been detained because he 
“associated with a known Al Qaida operative.” 
 “Give me his name,” says Idir.   
 The tribunal president answers, “I do not know.” 
 “How can I respond to this?” Idir asks. 
 “Did you know of anyone that was a member of Al Qaeda?” 
 “No. No.  This is something the interrogators told me a long while ago.  I asked 
the interrogators to tell me who this person was.  Then I could tell you if I might have 
known this person but not [known] if this person was a terrorist.  Maybe I knew this 
person as a friend.  Maybe it was a person that worked with me.  Maybe it was a person 
that was on my team.  But I do not know if this person is Bosnian, Indian, or whatever.  If 
you tell me the name, then I can respond and defend myself against this accusation.” 
 “We are asking the questions,” the tribunal president says, “and we need you to 
respond to what is on the unclassified summary.” 
 “If I was in your place,” Idir says eventually, “and I apologize in advance for 
these words—but if a supervisor came to me and showed me accusations like these, I 
would take these accusations and I would hit him in the face with them.  Sorry about 
that.”90  Everyone present laughs.  Idir is determined to be an enemy combatant. He 
remains at Guantanamo. 
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 Another of the Bosnians detained with Idir asks the CSRT to consider as evidence 
the decision of the Bosnian Supreme Court ordering his release.  The CSRT deems this 
decision not readily available, even though it has been filed with the district court in 
Washington D.C. and served on Executive lawyers in the heabeas litigation.91   
 Murat Kurnaz is detained on the grounds that a friend of his, Selcuk Bilgin, 
committed a suicide bombing.  Some evidence casts doubt on this theory, among it the 
fact that Bilgin is alive and well in Germany.  The investigative arm of the American 
Southern Command reports that it is “not aware of evidence that Kurnaz was or is a 
member of Al Qaeda.”  German intelligence confirms that Kurnaz has no connection to 
any Al Qaeda cell they know of.  Kurnaz’s CSRT pronounces him an enemy combatant.92   
In all, 558 CSRTs are held.  38 individuals are determined to be no longer enemy 
combatants.  A Seton Hall professor and his son review the 516 written determinations 
prepared after the hearings that explain why individuals were found to be enemy 
combatants.  They find that only 5% of the detainees were captured by U.S. forces.  55%  
are not alleged to have committed any hostile act against the U.S. or its allies.  Fleeing 
U.S. bombing is considered a hostile act.93   
 The Denbeaux go on to analyze the 393 available CSRT records and 102 
available full transcripts of hearings.94  They find that detainees were never allowed to 
call witnesses not already detained at Guantanamo, and that 50% of the requests for 
testimony by witnesses detained there were denied.  The only documentary evidence 
detainees were allowed to submit came from family and friends.  Detainees were not 
allowed to see the evidence against them.  Three times a tribunal initially found the 
detainee to be no longer an enemy combatant.  In each case, a second CSRT was 
conducted without the detainee’s participation or any notice to the detainee.  Twice the 
second CSRT determined that the detainee was an enemy combatant. Once the second 
CSRT found the detainee no longer an enemy combatant.  A third CSRT was convened, 
which made an enemy combatant finding.95 
 In the habeas cases filed in the D.C. federal district court, the government 
continues to argue that the detainees have no constitutional rights, but also claims that if 
such rights exist, the CSRTs are sufficient to meet the requirements set out by Hamdi.  
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One judge rejects both arguments.96  Another accepts the claim that aliens detained at 
Guantanamo have no constitutional rights.97  The decisions are appealed.  It is now the 
fall of 2005.  Mustafa Idir has been at Guantanamo for three and a half years.  During this 
time, he alleges, guards have jumped on his head, causing a stroke that paralyzed half his 
face, broken his fingers, and held his head under water.98  The only court to hear the 
charges against him, the Bosnian Supreme Court, has found no evidence to support his 
detention. 
 
IV. Congress Acts: The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
 
 In contrast to the courts, Congress is slow to take official action.  Some members 
have visited Guantanamo, where, according to a former interrogator, fake interrogations 
are staged for their benefit.99  In June 2005, Congress starts holding hearings on detention 
policy.  Members express outrage at the Time magazine report on the Al Qahtani 
interrogation, and also at the Pentagon’s insistence that his treatment was professional 
and humane.  “Dangerous, and very dumb, and very shortsighted,” says Nebraska Senator 
Chuck Hagel.  “This is not how you win the people of the world over to our side, 
especially the Muslim world.”100  A public opinion poll conducted June 20 and 21 finds 
that 20% of Americans believe Guantanamo detainees have been treated unfairly.  A 36% 
plurality think the treatment is “better than they deserve,” and 34% think it “about 
right.”101 
  On July 25, Arizona Senator John McCain offers two amendments to a defense 
appropriations bill.  The first protects individuals in the custody of the Department of 
Defense from interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual. The second 
protects individuals in the custody of the United States government—this extending to 
the CIA—from “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”  The President threatens to 
veto any bill that includes these amendments.102  Congress takes no action before the 
summer recess. 
In October, McCain brings the amendments back, and the White House responds 
by reiterating its veto threat.  Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina introduces 
different amendments stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed 
by Guantanamo detainees.  The legislation that emerges, the Detainee Treatment Act of 
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2005, includes the McCain amendments and provides for D.C. Circuit review of the 
CSRTs.  Apart from that, it eliminates habeas review of Guantanamo detentions.103   
 There are two public Executive responses.  First, faced with a prohibition on 
techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual, the Executive revises the Manual to 
include new aggressive interrogation techniques.  The precise nature of the techniques 
approved remains unknown, as the addendum in which they are included is classified.104  
Second, in signing the bill, the President includes a signing statement asserting that his 
administration will construe the bill “in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
authority of the president … as commander in chief and consistent with the constitutional 
limitations on the judicial power.”105  According to the OLC memos, this means that the 
limitations do not apply to any interrogation authorized by the President in connection 
with anti-terrorism efforts.106   
 There is also one non-public response.  The Office of Legal Counsel issues a 
classified opinion asserting that the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment does not bar waterboarding or any other of the techniques used by the CIA.107 
  
V. Military Commissions: The Executive, The Court, and Congress 
 
In addition to interrogation, some of the Guantanamo detainees are intended for 
trial.  The President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, authorized the trial of 
noncitizen terrorism suspects before military commissions.108 The commissions do not 
get started immediately, and they prove controversial even within the prosecution.  In 
March 2004, two Air Force prosecutors quit on the grounds that the process is “rigged.” 
They accuse other prosecutors of failing to preserve exculpatory evidence, ignoring 
allegations of torture, and other conduct that, they say, might “constitute dereliction of 
duty, false official statements, or other criminal conduct.”109  But in July 2004, Salim 
Ahmed Hamdan, a Guantanamo detainee who had served as a driver for Osama Bin 
Laden, is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by a military 
commission.  
Hamdan’s lawyers file a habeas action seeking to bar the trial, arguing that the 
Executive lacks the power to create military commissions unilaterally.  The case reaches 
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the Supreme Court in 2006, and on June 29, the Court rules in Hamdan’s favor.110  The 
Executive, the Court says, can create military commissions on its own authority only in 
compliance with the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions.  All detainees are 
protected by Common Article 3 of the Conventions.  The commissions created by the 
November 13 order fail to comply in several respects, most notably by preventing a 
defendant from seeing evidence against him and excluding him from the trial.111  The 
Court bars Hamdan’s trial from going forward. 
On September 6, 2006, the president announces that fourteen “high value” 
detainees, including Abu Zubaydeh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, have been 
transferred from CIA custody to Guantanamo.112  Bush declares that these detainees have 
been subjected to questioning techniques that are “tough, … and safe, and lawful, and 
necessary.”  “I want to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world,” he continues.  
“The United States does not torture.  It’s against our laws and against our values.”113  He 
asks Congress to authorize military commissions for their trials, and also to “make it 
clear that captured terrorists cannot use the Geneva Conventions to sue our personnel … 
The men and women who protect us should not have to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists 
because they’re doing their jobs.”  
Upon its return in September, Congress swiftly passes the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, and the President signs it on October 17.  The Act authorizes the President 
to establish military commissions for the trial of “any alien unlawful enemy 
combatant.”114  It prohibits courts from entertaining habeas petitions by aliens determined 
to be enemy combatants or awaiting such determination—that is, it authorizes the 
Executive to seize such people, including lawful residents of the U.S., and to detain and 
interrogate them indefinitely without access to courts.115  It provides that the Geneva 
Conventions shall not be a source of rights in any proceeding in U.S. courts to which the 
government is a party116 and gives retroactive protection to interrogators against civil or 
criminal liability.117  And it narrows the War Crimes Act, providing that only certain 
defined “grave breaches” of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions constitute 
War Crimes Act violations.118 
Once again, the commission process begins.  The first case up is that of David 
Hicks, an Australian captured in Afghanistan by Northern Alliance forces.  He pleads 
guilty to one count of providing material support for terrorism and is sentenced to seven 
years in prison.  He is given credit for the time spent in Guantanamo and is released to 
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Australia, to serve the remaining nine months.  He also agrees not to speak to the media 
for one year.  
The high-value detainees receive CSRT review.  All are determined to be enemy 
combatants.  In their hearings, several of them claim that they were tortured to induce 
false confessions.  Their descriptions of alleged torture are redacted from the 
transcripts.119  The Executive asserts that they should not be allowed to meet with 
lawyers because they may have come into possession of classified information “including 
… conditions of detention and alternative interrogation techniques.”120   
Before any of the high-value detainees can be brought before a military 
commission, the commissions themselves bring the trials to a halt.  Their statutory 
jurisdiction extends to the trial of people determined to be unlawful enemy combatants.  
But the CSRT rulings address only enemy combatant status, not lawfulness.  In the 
summer of 2007, two military judges dismiss charges against detainees on the theory that 
the jurisdiction of the commissions has not been established.121 In October, the chief 
prosecutor resigns, having, as he puts it, “concluded that full, fair and open trials were not 
possible under the current system.”122  Davis is scheduled to testify before a 
congressional committee examining the treatment of Guantanamo detainees, but is told 
that the Department of Defense will not permit him to do so.123  He is the second military 
lawyer whose testimony the Executive has blocked.124 
 
VI. All of the Above, More of the Same 
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Events continue to unfold, and this article cannot pursue them indefinitely.  I have 
chosen the delivery of this Donahue Lecture as a cut-off date.  Briefly, recent events 
suggest that the three branches will continue to act more or less as they have.   
The Executive will continue to attempt to run its interrogation programs more or 
less unilaterally.  On July 20, 2007, in response to Hamdan’s ruling that all detainees are 
protected by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the president issues an 
Executive order construing Common Article 3 “as applied to a program of interrogation 
and detention operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.”  The order provides that the 
program will be in compliance with Common Article 3 as long as it does not employ 
torture (as defined in the Torture Act), other “comparable” abuses, techniques prohibited 
by federal law, or “willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse done for the purpose of 
humiliating or degrading the individual in a manner so serious that any reasonable 
person, considering the circumstances, would deem the acts to be beyond the bounds of 
human decency.”  Detainees are to receive “the basic necessities of life” including 
“adequate food and water, shelter from the elements, necessary clothing, protections from 
extremes of heat and cold, and essential medical care.  A senior intelligence official 
refuses to comment when asked if waterboarding is permitted under the order.  Another 
official acknowledges that sleep is not among the protected necessities.125 
The judiciary will continue to push back.  Habeas litigation has continued in the 
district court for the District of Columbia, on behalf of Mustafa Idr and others.  Relying 
on the jurisdiction-stripping portions of the Military Commissions Act, the Executive 
asks for dismissal of the pending habeas petitions.  This raises a constitutional question, 
for the Suspension Clause of Article I provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”126  The strip is permissible if it does not constitute a suspension or 
if the CSRTs, with subsequent review in the D.C. Circuit, provide an adequate substitute.  
The D.C. Circuit reasons that the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 
1789, and decides that in 1789 it did not extend to aliens detained outside the sovereign 
territory of the United States.127  It dismisses the habeas petitions.  The Supreme Court 
denies certiorari on April 2, 2007—and then, on the last day of the Term, it reconsiders 
and grants the petition.128  Oral argument is held on December 5, 2007.   
 Congress will continue to do very little.  On September 14, 2007, CIA officials 
inform the media that director Michael Hayden has ordered the agency to discontinue 
waterboarding.129  During confirmation hearings for the nomination of Michael Mukasey 
as Attorney General, Senators repeatedly ask Mukasey whether he considers 
waterboarding to be torture.  Waterboarding has been described as torture by the Supreme 
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Court of Mississippi as long ago as 1926130 and the U.S. State Department at recently as 
1994.131  The United States has prosecuted it as a war crime.132   
Mukasey refuses to answer what he calls “hypotheticals.”133  The Senate confirms 
him by a vote of 53 to 40.134  In later testimony Mukasey suggests that whether 
waterboarding is torture depends on the importance of the information sought.  He 
comments that he “can’t contemplate any situation in which this President would assert 
Article II authority to do something the law forbids,” despite a history of signing 
statements asserting just that.  He also refuses to share with the Judiciary committee, even 
in closed session, the executive theory as to why CIA enhanced interrogation techniques 
are not illegal.135 
On December 13, 2007, the House passes a bill that would require the CIA to 
adhere to the interrogation standards set out in the Army Field Manual.  The White House 
threatens a veto on the grounds that such a restriction would  
“prevent the President from taking lawful actions necessary to protect Americans from 
attack in wartime.”136  Senator Lindsay Graham blocks a Senate vote.137  On February 12, 
the Senate approves the bill. “The President will veto that Bill,” says a White House 
spokesman.  “The United States needs the ability to interrogate effectively, within the 
law, captured al Qaeda terrorists.”138 
 
VI. Analysis 
 
 In its most skeletal outlines, this story is a fairly simple tale of action and reaction 
by the three branches, the sort of interplay that high school civics teaches us to expect.  
The Executive makes aggressive claims of authority.  The Supreme Court pushes back in 
Hamdi, Rasul, and Padilla.  Congress offers a middle ground with the Detainee 
Treatment Act.  The Executive moves forward with military commissions, the Court 
pushes back in Hamdan, and Congress generally supports the Executive in the Military 
Commissions Act.  We are now waiting to see what the Court will do, and whether 
Congress will change its position now that the Democrats are in control. 
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 That is description.  Now it is time for evaluation.  To get a full view of the 
interplay between the branches of government in recent years, we would have to look at 
many other areas—the battle over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and 
warrantless surveillance, for instance.  I am looking at one area, Executive detention, and 
not even all of that.  (I have not said much about the CIA black sites, or the prisons in 
Iraq or at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.) But this one area is enough to support 
an evaluation of the performances of the different branches, on their own and in 
comparison to relevant historical precedents. 
 
The Executive 
 
 It is relatively common to say that the Bush administration has a radical theory of 
Executive authority.139  Some of its assertions are indeed quite radical—the claim, for 
instance, that the Executive can detain an American inside the United States and hold him 
indefinitely without charges or access to the courts.  Or the claim that the Executive 
violates no enforceable law if it tortures or arbitrarily executes aliens detained abroad.  
But a look at history shows that these claims are not as unprecedented as they might 
seem. 
 One of the current signature moves of Executive lawyers is the theory I have 
called the commander-in-chief override—the claim that the president, when acting as 
commander-in-chief, is immune to congressional regulation.  Here is one formulation of 
it, from argument before the Supreme Court.   
Question:  “I understood you to say that if [the President] acted in conflict with 
the Acts of Congress it was still all right.”   
Answer: “He must have some constitutional power that Congress cannot interfere 
with, as Commander-in-Chief.”140 
Another is the theory that the nature of this war makes the whole world a 
battlefield, so that the Commander-in-Chief power can be exercised everywhere.  Again, 
an Executive lawyer before the Supreme Court: The conditions of previous wars “do not 
today exist, and a bomber may drop a bomb tomorrow on Chicago.  Can it be said that 
there is no area of warfare, no area of military operations, in Chicago under those 
circumstances?  I think not.”141 
But both of those quotes, as you’ve probably guessed, are not from Bush 
administration lawyers.  They’re from Attorney General Francis Biddle, arguing before 
the Supreme Court in ex parte Quirin, a 1942 case about Nazi saboteurs tried before a 
military commission pursuant to the orders of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  The 
Executive strategy with respect to military tribunals this time around clearly relied 
heavily on the Quirin precedent—even the section of Bush’s Order proclaiming that 
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persons subject to it had no right to seek relief in court tracked a similar Proclamation by 
FDR.142 
In FDR’s defense, that order was aimed narrowly, at eight individuals about 
whose guilt there was no doubt.  But of course the Roosevelt Administration engaged in 
broader-based detention as well: as we all know, it detained over a hundred thousand 
American citizens of Japanese descent without any sort of individualized hearings. 
So what is distinctive about the current Executive?  A few things.  First, the 
commander-in-chief override is pushed to extremes well beyond what prior 
administrations have asserted.  Most constitutional scholars will tell you that there is an 
area where the powers of congress and the Executive overlap, and that within this zone, if 
the powers are used in conflicting ways, sometimes Congress wins and sometimes the 
Executive does.  This is what Attorney General Biddle was arguing, and it is basically the 
import of Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown.143  The Bush OLC 
lawyers, however, seem to have taken the position that Executive power prevails 
whenever it exists.  That is radical, and quite implausible, and I think undesirable as 
well.144 
Second, there is strategic behavior designed to avoid legal constraint.  You see 
this in the analysis of the OLC memos, and most notably in the selection of Guantanamo 
as a detention site.  Guantanamo is chosen because OLC lawyers believe that it is beyond 
of the jurisdiction of federal courts and that neither the federal torture statute nor the 
Constitution applies to actions taken there.   
There is something bad about that.  It treats the Constitution the way aggressive 
lawyers treat the tax code, as an annoyance to be evaded.  It must be followed, if you 
cannot figure out how to get around it, but it is not of any normative significance.  And 
Guantanamo is in fact much like a tax shelter, something created for no purpose but 
circumvention of the law.  But using clever constructs to avoid tax liability is one thing; 
using them to evade the Constitution is another.  Constitutional prohibitions on brutal or 
shocking conduct reflect a moral judgment that there are some things our government 
should not do to people.  It does not matter much to this moral judgment where those 
things are done, and so there is something problematic about eluding the reach of the 
prohibition in a way that does nothing to make the conduct less offensive.  Treating the 
Constitution like the tax code disrespects it, and to the extent that the Constitution is a 
charter of American values, it disrespects those values. 
Third, there is an insistence on secrecy.  To a certain degree, this is 
understandable—covert operations cannot be conducted in the open.  But at some point, 
the Executive’s persistent refusal to produce any evidence in support of its claims 
damages public confidence.  Opting not to defend the detention of Yaser Hamdi in court, 
for instance, but rather to release him, tends to create the impression that the case against 
him was weak.  So does the transfer of Jose Padilla into the criminal justice system and 
the abandonment of the dirty bomb allegations.  So does the fact that 405 of the people 
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detained at Guantanamo—once described as hardened terrorists all—have been 
released.145 
And at some point the insistence on secrecy becomes simply grotesque.  The 
administration, I have mentioned, has argued that the fourteen high value detainees 
transferred to Guantanamo should not be allowed to meet with lawyers.  The detainees, 
the administration says, might have come into possession of classified information they 
could disclose.  What kind of classified information would these people have?  
“Information,” the administration says, “including … conditions of detention and 
alternative interrogation techniques.”146  You can figure out, I think, how the detainees 
“came into possession” of information about alternative interrogation techniques.  
Arguing that people who allege that they have been tortured should not be allowed to 
meet with lawyers because they might describe the techniques used to torture them does 
not show the Executive in a very good light.147  The reliance on the state secrets doctrine 
to obtain dismissal of other suits alleging mistreatment is not much better.148 
 Last, of course, there is the use of alternative interrogation techniques itself.  I 
will say more about that later.   
I give the Executive low marks.  They are not unprecedentedly low; the basic 
pattern in our history is that the Executive responds to crisis with measures that in 
retrospect seem unnecessary, unwise, and undesirable.149  But one might hope that we 
could learn from this history even as we repeat it.150 
 
Congress 
 
 The most striking feature of Congress’s post-9/11 performance is its passivity.  
Congress has done little except to give the President power and restrict the possibility of 
judicial oversight.  (The notable exception is the enactment of provisions restricting, to 
some degree, permissible interrogation methods.151)   
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 This would have surprised James Madison, who believed that the separation of 
powers between Executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government would 
protect liberty.152  But it should not surprise us.  Madison’s belief that separated powers 
would prevent abuse rested on the premise that officeholders would feel loyalty to their 
offices.  Members of Congress, on this view, would seek to protect and expand the power 
of Congress, and they would naturally resist power grabs by the Executive.  As Madison 
put it, “ambition [will] counteract ambition.”153 
 Madison never gave any reason why this institutional loyalty would exist, but it 
might have seemed plausible in the Framers’ world, a world without political parties.  
Bring political parties into the picture, however, and things change dramatically.  
Members of Congress who are of the same political party as the president do not see him 
as a rival.  They see him as the captain of their team.  What that means is that the high 
school civics model of separation of powers is false.  If the President’s party controls 
Congress, Congress is unlikely to be much of a check on Executive ambition. 
 That, of course, is what we have seen: one-party rule produces very little in the 
way of congressional oversight or resistance.  Divided rule produces something more—
though not, perhaps, as much as one might hope for.  Even a minority of the President’s 
party in the Senate can filibuster or prevent the override of a presidential veto.  The short 
lesson is that Congress is simply no match for the Executive. 
 Again, however, history shows that our times are not exceptional.  The World 
War II internment was accomplished in a system of one-party rule, and Congress showed 
no inclination to restrain Executive power.  Justice Robert Jackson, in fact, warned of the 
effects of the party system in his celebrated Youngstown concurrence over fifty years ago, 
writing that the party system “has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to 
real Executive power. … Party loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, 
extend his power into branches other than his own … .”154 Congress, I would say, is not 
performing especially well, but a Congress controlled by the President’s party cannot be 
expected to do much other than follow the Executive’s lead.   More can be demanded of 
the new Democratic Congress, which thus far it has not produced.155  The confirmation of 
an attorney general who refuses to state for the record whether waterboarding is torture is 
an embarrassment to the party and the nation.   
  
The Judiciary 
 
 In the absence of congressional pushback, the responsibility for restraining 
Executive claims of authority has fallen almost entirely to the courts.  I think the courts 
have done a good job.  At the least, they have refused to accede to the most dramatic 
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claims of Executive authority—the unreviewable authority to arrest, detain, and 
psychologically break American citizens for the purpose of interrogation.156   
The Court’s performance also stacks up well against the historical record.  In 
times of crisis, courts tend to defer.  (Chief Justice Taney’s issuance of the writ of habeas 
corpus that Lincoln defied is a notable counterexample.)  The World War II Court, for 
instance, was clearly uncomfortable with the internment of Japanese Americans.  It did 
not want to endorse the race-based detention of citizens, and indeed in the three 
internment decisions it never did.  Hirabayashi157 upheld a curfew, and Korematsu158 
upheld exclusion orders.  The Court refused to consider detention in Korematsu, and 
when it did get around to detention in Endo159 it said that this exceeded the power granted 
the War Relocation Authority.   
But the World War II Court never interfered with any Executive programs, and 
when it pronounced the camps unauthorized, it did so the day after the Executive had 
declared that they would be closed.  This Court, in contrast, has rejected some Executive 
claims on constitutional grounds, and ruled in other cases that the Executive cannot 
proceed without congressional authorization.  It has slowed down the most aggressive 
Executive programs and for others required wider political backing in the form of 
congressional support.  That is probably all we can realistically ask. 
 
 The People 
 
 The Executive is performing badly, Congress not much better, and the judiciary 
fairly well.  But the evaluation is not over.  The Executive’s detention and interrogation 
program is clearly not, as was once suggested, the work of a few bad apples.  Rather, 
responsibility goes right to the top.  That is, to us. 
 The great innovation of the Framers of our Constitution was to create a 
government that is not our master but our servant.  We the people are the ultimate 
sovereign.  The government acts for us; what it does, it does in our name and with the 
power we have given it.  And its acts, as hornbook agency law will tell you, are 
attributable to us, for good or for ill.  If it spreads liberty and relieves suffering, we can 
take pride in those acts as our own.  If it tortures, we are torturers. 
Of course, we cannot control what we do not know.  And certainly the Executive 
has done the best it could to prevent the American people from reaching an informed 
decision about these policies.  It has gone to great lengths to prevent facts from coming 
out in court—it has released alleged terrorists rather than explain why it was holding 
them.  It has tried in other ways to undermine or derail the legal process that could bring 
truth to light.  It has put pressure on the detainees’ military lawyers;160 it has harassed 
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grounds that subjection to enhanced interrogation makes their bodies, in effect, state 
secrets.  It has ordered military lawyers not to testify before Congress about the effect of 
interrogation techniques on their ability to prosecute suspects.163  It has destroyed tapes 
that might clarify the question of whether those interrogation techniques constitute 
torture, in defiance of at least one judicial order.164  And it has been, perhaps, less than 
candid in court, as when Paul Clement answered Justice Ginsburg’s question about “mild 
torture” with the flat statement “our Executive doesn’t.” 165 
But Clement was right about one thing.  It is our Executive.  And after a certain 
point, one can only conclude that we have ratified its actions.  Everything I have 
discussed here is public; every example and anecdote comes from the pages of major 
papers.  If the American people let these programs continue, it is because, in some sense, 
we want them.  Or at least, we are too frightened, too passive, or too preoccupied with 
Britney Spears to stop them. 
And so now I want to explain why I think they should stop, why the policies we 
have been pursuing are not just shameful but disastrous.  For those of you who are 
categorically opposed to torture, I probably don’t need to say anything more.  I had you at 
“waterboarding.”  But what about those who think that in times of crisis it is appropriate 
to defer to the expertise and energy of the Executive?166 
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The Executive has certainly displayed energy.  But it has not been an inspiring 
example of expertise.  If we think about torture in terms of its costs and benefits, it is 
reasonably clear that this is bad policy. 
The benefit of torture is that it makes people talk.  But this is not an unalloyed 
benefit, because talking and providing truthful information are very different things.  In 
the Korean war, captured American aviators gave lengthy confessions about their plans to 
bomb civilian targets with bacteriological weapons.  These confessions, it turned out, 
were coerced by various interrogation tactics like sleep deprivation, stress positions, 
isolation, and extended interrogation.  In light of this experience, the armed forces began 
training individuals at risk of capture to resist these tactics in the SERE program—
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape.  The regulations governing the SERE 
program explain that these techniques are illegal, but that other nations have not adhered 
to the Geneva Conventions.  
When Guantanamo interrogators started looking for what General James Hill 
called “counter-resistant techniques,” they turned to the SERE instructors. The list of 
techniques approved by Rumsfeld in December 2002 “resulted from a close collaboration 
between experts from the Army SERE school at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and 
interrogation teams at Guantanamo.”167  The significance of the fact that these techniques 
were originally used by the North Koreans not to extract truthful information but to 
generate false confessions for propaganda purposes seems not to have been considered. 
But we know beyond a doubt that they have produced false confessions in our hands as 
well.  Shafiq Rasul, for example, admitted to being in Afghanistan and meeting with 
Mohammed Atta, when we know he was in England. 
False confessions are a serious problem.  They harm the innocents who confess, 
when they are used to justify continue detention or punishment.  And they can cause 
harm even when the confessor is guilty, if he implicates innocent people.  Mohammed Al 
Qatani, during the period of his enhanced interrogation, was repeatedly shown 
photographs of other Guantanamo detainees.  Eventually he implicated thirty of them.168  
How trustworthy are those statements?  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, during a CSRT 
hearing at which he confessed to involvement in a number of plots substantially 
exceeding what most intelligence experts believe possible, expressly stated that 
techniques used in prior interrogations had led him to implicate innocent detainees.169  
And the costs go beyond the possible detention of innocents.  If the invasion of Iraq was 
triggered in part by faulty intelligence, it is worth considering the case of Ibn Shaykh al 
Libi.  Al Libi admitted that he and other al Qaeda operatives had traveled to Iraq and 
received training in the use of chemical and biological weapons—weapons of mass 
destruction. 170  The confession was elicited through interrogation by CIA operatives, 
who took al Libi out of the custody of the FBI, and then by Egyptian officials after al Libi 
was rendered to Egypt.171  Secretary of State Colin Powell relied on Al Libi’s statements 
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in making his case for war to the U.N. Security Council.172  Once removed from the 
interrogation context, al Libi recanted, and intelligence experts now consider his 
confession untrue.173 
Viewed simply from the perspective of getting the best intelligence, torture is bad 
policy—as the pre-revision Army Field Manual on Interrogations noted.174  But of course 
there are other costs.  One is that it makes prosecution more difficult.  The criminal 
charges against Jose Padilla made no mention of the dirty bomb plot, in part no doubt due 
to the fact that such as evidence as existed would not be admissible in federal court 
because of the means used to extract it.  (When a Marine lawyer was scheduled to testify 
before Congress about the extent to which enhanced interrogation techniques had 
interfered with his ability to prosecute terrorism suspects, the Executive ordered him not 
to appear.175) 
By far the most serious cost, however, is the damage that the use of torture does to 
our counterterrorism campaign.  “By our efforts,” said Bush in his second inaugural 
address, “we have lit a fire in the minds of men.”  Indeed we have.  We have taken the 
worldwide shock and horror at the events of September 11 and replaced it with shock and 
horror directed at us.  There is almost nothing that would more effectively breed new 
enemies and squander goodwill than what we have done.  Our treatment of those we 
accuse of terrorism betrays the values and principles of America.  It makes us seem 
hypocrites; it gains us no friends.  Worse, our specific methods of interrogation—sexual 
humiliation and religious denigration—suggest hostility to the values and principles of 
Islam.  That gains us enemies.176 
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This is a terrible mistake.  As Donald Rumsfeld said, we should measure our 
progress by asking whether we are “capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more 
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and 
deploying against us.”  The answer to this question is no.  Terrorist attacks are on the rise.  
The State Department’s annual survey was canceled in 2005, but a State Department 
terrorism expert says it would have shown 625 significant attacks in 2004, more than 
triple the number from 2002 and 2003.177   
 There are people we need to kill, and people we need to capture.  There are people 
we need to deter by demonstrating our resolve.  But mostly we need to dissuade.  One of 
the many ways in which the war on terror differs from a conventional war is that the 
enemy is not a conventional standing army that can be defeated once and for all.  This 
enemy can reconstitute itself; it can do so indefinitely if we give it a strong enough 
rallying cry.   
But it can also wither away.  Terrorist groups cannot draft new members; every 
person who joins their ranks makes a choice to do so.  The most important thing we can 
do is reduce the reasons to make that choice.  The best to way to fight terrorism is to stop 
people from becoming terrorists.  In that venture, we need the support and cooperation of 
the rest of the world, particularly the Islamic world.  Moderate Islam is the most powerful 
opponent of radical Islam, and moderate Islam must be our ally.178   
What we have been doing is counterproductive,179 and it has gone on far too long.  
In the span of time since September 11, earlier generations won independence from the 
British Empire, subdued the Confederate South, and defeated Imperial Japan and Nazi 
Germany.  We have made little appreciable progress, and by many measures things have 
gotten worse.  Deference to Executive expertise is no longer an appropriate response. 
 I do not think there is anything particularly revelatory about that observation.  I 
think it is rather obvious.  The hard question is not whether we are on the right path; it is 
how we have gone so far down the wrong one.  How, people wonder, could Americans 
do these things?  How could other Americans let them be done? 
 In that wonderment is the answer, and also the seed of these acts.  What is behind 
the tales of abuse and the lack of outrage is a simple cycle of self-reinforcing beliefs. 
 First, our enemies are bad, and there is little need to worry about how we treat 
them.  As Dick Cheney put it, “[t]he important thing to understand is that the people that 
are at Guantánamo are bad people. I mean, these are terrorists for the most part.”180  Or in 
the words of a guard at Bagram Air Force Base, “We were pretty much told that they 
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were nobodies, that they were just enemy combatants.  … We called them hajis, and that 
psychology was really important.”181   
Second, we are good, and what we do is just.  As Senator Jim Talent said, “I don’t 
need an investigation to tell me that there was no comprehensive or systematic use of 
inhumane tactics by the American military because those guys and gals just wouldn’t do 
it.”  “America does not torture” is a premise, not a conclusion.  That is the only sense that 
can be given to Bush’s repeated assertions. Our character is the measure of our actions, 
and whatever we have done, it can’t have been torture.   
 Last, the circle closes.  When you see the Guantanamo detainee lying next to the 
pile of hair he’s pulled out,182 when the Iraqi general you have wrapped in electrical cord 
inside a sleeping bag and jumped on emerges dead,183 when the Afghan detainee chained 
naked to the floor overnight is found frozen to death in the morning,184 when the taxi 
driver’s heart gives out after four days of being beaten and chained to the ceiling,185 it is 
hard to deny that something inhumane has been done.  A natural reaction follows.  If we 
have treated people inhumanely, and we are good, they must be bad.  Like a coerced 
confession used to justify further interrogation, like a counter-resistant technique come 
into the possession of those subjected to it, the fact of mistreatment itself implies 
culpability.  Guilt is written on the body, where we have placed it. The alternative is too 
terrible to contemplate.  
 What I say now is trite.  I apologize for that, but it is our misfortune to live in a 
time when trite things need saying.  The cycle of these beliefs runs backwards.  Actions 
are the measure of character.  We are good because our actions are just, and if we do not 
act justly, we are not good.  The belief in our inherent innocence, our unalterable 
righteousness, is the most dangerous seduction of all.  
What we need instead is, for lack of a better word, empathy.  We need it not 
because we should care about terrorists or blame ourselves for being attacked, or any of 
the things some people would have you think.  We need it because we cannot afford the 
blinding assumption that anything we do is right, that anyone we detain is guilty, that any 
confession they give is true, that anyone who questions any of the above is unpatriotic.  
We need to understand ourselves better than that, and we need to understand our enemies 
better too.  Only that understanding will allow us to fight them in ways that do not 
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simultaneously increase their numbers; only that will allow us to stop people from 
becoming enemies in the first place.   
Some people, surely, cannot be stopped.  There are people who hate us for any 
number of reasons.  There may even be some who hate our freedom.  We cannot stop 
them from hating us, but we can control why.  Let us be hated for what is best in us, not 
what is worst.  Let us be hated for being good.  If terrorists kill Americans because our 
government stands for democracy and religious toleration, that is sad, but it is a price we 
should not shrink to pay.  Some things are worth dying for.  But if terrorists kill 
Americans because our government has tortured their coreligionists with little regard for 
guilt or innocence, that is not just sad.  It is sickening.  It is a cost this country should 
never bear. 
 There will come a time when we will have to ask ourselves, when this was going 
on, what did I do?  While my government pursued this disastrous and shameful course, 
while it made me complicit in torture, while it sought to uproot two centuries of law in 
the name of secrecy and fear, while it made me and those I love less safe and less free, 
what did I do?  There will be a time when we must face that question, we lawyers 
especially. 
 I say that time is now.  I say that time is always. And I say “nothing” is not an 
answer.  To say “I did nothing” is to say “I helped.” 
 
 
 
